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Key Points
•	 From	Sweden’s	point	of	view	of,	the	post-Cold	War	strategic	
timeout	 in	 Europe	 is	 coming	 to	 an	 end.	 The	 international	
environment	is	reverting	to	a	condition	in	which	the	use	of	
force	among	states,	including	countries	in	the	Baltic	Sea	re-
gion,	 is	no	 longer	an	 improbable	 scenario.	Sweden	believes	
that	crises	or	conflicts	that	could	directly	or	indirectly	affect	
the	country	might	potentially	occur	 in	Northern	Europe	 in	
the	future.	
This	perception	stems	from:	(1)	rising	uncertainty	 in	North-
ern	Europe	(the	Baltic	Sea	and	High	North	regions)	where	new	
possibilities	 are	 emerging	 for	 extraction	 and	 transportation	
of	energy	resources,	maritime	 transport	and	fishing;	 (2)	 the	
reforms	and	modernisation	of	Russia’s	Armed	Forces,	and	the	
lowering	of	the	country’s	threshold	for	the	use	of	force	in	its	
immediate	neighbourhood.
•	 In	this	context,	the	transformations	of	Sweden’s	defence	pol-
icy	over	the	last	twenty	years	have	become	a	problem	for	the	
country.	Sweden	has	moved	from	neutrality,	i.e.	non-involve-
ment	on	any	side	of	armed	interstate	conflicts,	 to	non-align-
ment,	whereby	it	remains	outside	military	alliances	and	freely	
decides	its	policies	during	wartime.	Those	changes,	combined	
with	the	integration	in	the	region	and	Sweden’s	accession	to	
the	EU	in	1995,	as	well	as	the	country’s	limited	capabilities	to	
defend	its	own	territory,	have	resulted	in	the	need	for	Sweden	
to	seek	a	new	formula	for	its	military	security.	
The	2009	unilateral	declaration	of	solidarity	with	the	Nor-
dic	and	EU	states,	which	also	spelt	out	Sweden’s	expectation	
of	solidarity	from	those	countries	in	the	event	of	a	natural	
disaster	 or	 armed	 attack	 affecting	 Sweden,	 is	 politically	
and	militarily	 only	 an	 illusory	 solution	 to	 Sweden’s	 secu-
rity	dilemma.	
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•	 The	real	choice	that	Sweden	faces	is	between	maintaining	the	
status	of	a	non-aligned	state	and	considerably	 increasing	 its	
defence	spending	on	the	one	hand,	and	joining	NATO	on	the	
other;	even	though	other	proposals,	such	as	evolution	of	Nor-
dic	or	Swedish-Finnish	co-operation	towards	a	military	alli-
ance,	have	also	been	raised	in	public	debate	in	Sweden.	
None	of	the	solutions	proposed	is	simple	or	practicable	for	the	
current	conservative-liberal	government.	In	the	coming	years	
Sweden	will	probably	remain	outside	NATO,	make	some	ad-
justments	to	its	military	reforms	and	slightly	increase	its	de-
fence	spending	(which	currently	stands	at	around	1.1%	of	GDP,	
or	US$6.2	billion).	The	country	will	continue	to	develop	Nordic	
co-operation	(even	if	some	limitations	are	placed	on	this),	and	
will	work	closer	together	with	NATO.	
•	 The	changes	in	Sweden’s	defence	discourse	and	policy	may	be	
conducive	 to	 strengthening	 security	 in	 the	Baltic	 Sea	 region.	
Closer	 political	 and	military	 co-operation	 in	 the	 region	may	
serve	 as	 a	 preventative	 and	 deterrent	 measure,	 and	 enable	
a	faster	and	better	co-ordinated	response	in	the	event	of	a	crisis.
Politically,	 Sweden’s	 perception	 of	 the	 geopolitical	 changes	
in	the	Baltic	Sea	and	the	High	North	regions	may	strengthen	
those	 voices	within	 NATO	 (and	 even	within	 the	 EU)	which	
have	been	warning	about	 the	growing	 instability	and	possi-
bility	of	crises	in	the	peripheries	of	NATO	and	the	EU.	Formats	
such	as	the	Northern	Group	offer	opportunities	for	enhanced	
regional	security	co-operation.	
In	 the	military	dimension,	Sweden	will	 seek	 to	 improve	 the	
interoperability	between	its	Armed	Forces	and	NATO,	for	ex-
ample	 by	 participating	 in	 the	NATO	 Response	 Force	within	
the	Connected	Forces	Initiative.	Co-operation	may	also	extend	
to	safeguarding	energy	and	cyber-security,	as	well	as	the	se-
curity	of	critical	infrastructures	in	those	areas.	
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•	 The	Nordic	states	are	Sweden’s	main	partners	for	military	co-	
-operation	with	regard	to	both	training	&	exercises	as	well	as	
armament	and	military	equipment	 co-operation.	To	a	 lesser	
extent,	 the	 changes	 in	 Swedish	 discourse	will	 contribute	 to	
the	development	of	bilateral	defence	co-operation	with	coun-
tries	outside	this	group.	Poland	is	not	one	of	Sweden’s	prior-
ity	partners	for	military	co-operation,	and	is	seen	by	Sweden	
mainly	as	a	NATO	member	in	the	region. 
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introduction
Sweden’s	 defence	 policy	 has	 undergone	 profound	 changes	 over	
the	 last	twenty	years.	For	two	centuries,	or	since	the	end	of	the	
Napoleonic	wars,	Sweden	pursued	a	policy	of	neutrality,	that	is,	
non-involvement	in	armed	interstate	conflicts.	It	also	maintained	
a	 considerable	 capacity	 to	defend	country’s	 territory.	As	 the	 se-
curity	 environment	 changed	 –	 after	 the	 break-up	 of	 the	 Soviet	
Union,	the	accession	of	Central	European	countries	to	the	EU	and	
NATO,	and	Sweden’s	own	accession	to	the	EU	in	1995	–	the	coun-
try	gradually	started	to	transform	its	defence	policy.	In	the	1990s	
it	gave	up	neutrality	and	declared	 itself	a	non-aligned	state,	 i.e.	
one	 that	remained	outside	military	alliances	and	freely	decided	
its	 policies	 in	 wartime.	 Sweden	 started	 to	 perceive	 the	 tradi-
tional	threats	to	state	security	as	no	longer	being	relevant,	while	
the	challenges	posed	by	global	phenomena	such	as	 terrorism	or	
crises	in	failed	states	gained	more	prominence.	Adapting	to	this	
new	situation,	Sweden	reformed	its	armed	forces	to	make	them	
compatible	with	its	policy	of	active	participation	in	international	
crisis	management.	The	result	was	that	the	Swedish	military’s	ca-
pability	to	defend	its	national	territory,	which	previously	consti-
tuted	one	of	 the	pillars	of	Sweden’s	neutrality	and	security,	has	
been	diminished.	
Nowadays,	the	Swedish	government	perceives	that	the	post-Cold	
War	strategic	timeout	is	coming	to	an	end,	and	the	security	en-
vironment	 is	 reverting	 to	 a	 condition	 in	which	 the	use	 of	 force	
among	countries	in	Europe	is	no	longer	an	improbable	scenario.	
Noting	the	declining	stability	of	its	region,	Sweden	adopted	a	doc-
trine	of	‘solidarity’	with	the	Nordic	and	EU	states	in	2009,	which	
also	expressed	an	expectation	of	assistance	from	those	countries	
if	Sweden	came	under	threat.	The	Swedish	government	declared	
that	the	security	of	Sweden	and	the	region	would	be	built	up	in	
solidarity	and	interdependence	with	the	states	named	in	the	dec-
laration	(in	effect,	meaning	NATO).	However,	recent	statements	
by	NATO	representatives	have	called	the	legitimacy	of	this	policy	
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into	question	and,	together	with	recent	analyses	which	have	re-
vealed	the	Swedish	Armed	Forces’	limited	capability	to	defend	the	
country	resulted	in	Sweden	having	to	seek	a	new	formula	for	its	
military	security.
The	 doctrine	 of	 neutrality,	 to	 which	 Sweden	 adhered	 until	 the	
early	1990s,	has	become	an	element	of	national	identity	so	deeply	
held	by	 the	public	and	sections	of	 the	political	class	 that	 it	now	
limits	Sweden’s	room	for	manoeuvre	with	regard	to	its	potential	
accession	to	NATO.	Considering	the	need	to	consolidate	public	fi-
nances,	which	may	put	some	limits	on	increasing	defence	spend-
ing	 in	 the	coming	years,	Sweden	now	faces	a	 serious	challenge:	
how	can	it	guarantee	the	military	security	of	the	state	in	a	dete-
riorating	regional	security	environment?	And	what	consequences	
could	the	changes	in	Sweden’s	defence	discourse	and	policy	have	
for	security	and	co-operation	in	the	Baltic	Sea	region?	
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i. From neutrality to non-alignment
Dating	back	to	 1812,	Swedish	neutrality	meant	neutrality	during	
wartime:	 it	was	 not	 stipulated	 in	 international	 agreements,	 but	
stemmed	 from	 the	 government’s	 unilateral	 declaration,	 as	 well	
as	its	consistent	foreign	and	security	policy	in	wartime	(in	other	
words,	it	was	different	from	the	constant	neutrality	of	Austria	or	
Switzerland,	and	more	closely	resembled	the	neutrality	of	Finland	
or	Ireland)1.	The	primary	objective	was	to	protect	Sweden	from	be-
coming	entangled	in	war	operations.	Indeed,	its	declared	neutral-
ity	has	ensured	peace	for	Sweden	for	the	last	two	centuries,	and	in	
addition	has	become	one	of	the	defining	elements	of	Swedish	na-
tional	identity.	However,	the	doctrine	of	neutrality	has	also	been	
treated	as	an	instrument	of	Sweden’s	broader	security	policy.	Suc-
cessive	Swedish	governments	based	their	policies	on	the	rhetoric	
of	neutrality	while	pragmatically	adapting	to	the	challenges	posed	
by	the	world	around	them.	They	were	prone	to	make	compromises	
that	seriously	dented	the	doctrine	of	neutrality,	but	were	effective	
in	keeping	Sweden	away	from	war	theatres2.	During	World	War	II,	
Sweden	managed	to	avoid	German	occupation	at	the	price	of	politi-
cal	and	economic	concessions	to	the	Third	Reich	3.
1	 Neutral	states	make	a	commitment	that	during	wartime	they	will	not	allow	
any	passage	of	troops,	arms	or	food	transports	via	their	land	territory;	any	
use	of	their	air	space	by	military	aircraft	of	the	states	at	war	for	passage,	
observation	of	troops	movements	or	military	operations	in	their	air	space;	
the	establishment	of	operating	bases	in	their	territorial	waters	by	the	states	
at	war,	 or	 the	 use	 of	 their	 ports	 by	 such	 states’	warships.	 See	Remigiusz	
Bierzanek,	Janusz	Symonides,	Prawo	międzynarodowe	publiczne,	Warsaw	
2005,	p.	436-440.
2	 Daniela	Schüngel,	Schwedens	Sicherheitspolitik	im	Wandel.	Zwischen	mil-
itärischer	Allianzfreiheit,	NATO	und	ESVP,	HSFK-Report	14/2005,	Hessische	
Stiftung	Friedens-	und	Konfliktforschung,	Frankfurt	am	Main	2005,	p.	4-6.
3	 Sweden	supplied	high-quality	iron	ore	to	the	Third	Reich,	covering	40%	of	
German	industry’s	needs	during	World	War	II.	It	also	permitted	the	trans-
port	of	Wehrmacht	troops	via	its	territory	(around	17,000	Wehrmacht	sol-
diers	crossed	Sweden	during	the	initial	phase	of	Operation	Barbarossa,	and	
later	 Sweden	would	 allow	German	 soldiers	 on	 leave	 to	 cross	 its	 territory	
on	their	way	from	Norway	to	Germany).	See	Tony	Judt,	Powojnie.	Historia	
Europy	od	roku	1945,	Poznań	2010,	p.	108.
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during the cold War, sweden also declared itself to be a neu-
tral state.	The	aim	was	 to	avoid	 involvement	 in	a	possible	con-
frontation	between	NATO	and	the	Warsaw	Pact,	and	to	improve	
stability	in	Northern	Europe	by	maintaining	the	so-called	Nordic	
balance4.	While	declaring	that	it	possessed	sufficient	capacity	to	
defend	the	country	 independently,	 the	Swedish	Ministry	of	De-
fence	nevertheless	covertly	admitted	that	the	chances	of	avoiding	
involvement	in	war	operations	in	Europe	were	slim,	and	that	in	
the	event	of	war,	the	only	way	to	avoid	a	Soviet	occupation	would	
be	 to	 quickly	 obtain	 assistance	 from	 the	West.	 Therefore,	 suc-
cessive	 Swedish	 governments	 covertly	 co-operated	 with	 NATO	
member	states,	in	order	to	ensure	assistance	for	Sweden	from	the	
Alliance’s	air	 forces	 if	needed5.	Moreover,	 its	status	as	a	neutral	
state	allowed	Sweden	to	position	itself	as	an	impartial	mediator	in	
conflicts	and	crises	the	world	over,	and	its	active	policies	within	
the	United	Nations	 strengthened	 its	 international	position.	The	
Sweden’s	policy	of	neutrality	applied	to	classic	armed	interstate	
conflicts	but	not	to	UN	peace	operations.
the end of the cold War changed the fundamental circum-
stances of sweden’s defence policy.	The	geopolitical	changes	in	
the	 region	 and	 the	 integration	 of	 Central	 European	 states	with	
the	EU	and	NATO,	as	well	as	Sweden’s	own	accession	to	the	Eu-
ropean	Union	in	1995	had	a	considerable	impact	on	the	country’s	
security	policy.	Sweden	found	the	traditional	security	threats	to	
its	own	country	and	the	region	to	no	longer	be	relevant.	It	adopted	
a	broad	definition	of	national	security	in	which	the	focus	was	on	
4	 The	 ‘Nordic	 balance’	 during	 the	Cold	War	was	 intended	 to	 ensure	 stabil-
ity	and	security	for	Northern	Europe,	with	Denmark	and	Norway	as	NATO	
members	who,	nevertheless,	pursued	strict	policies	with	regard	to	the	es-
tablishment	of	NATO	military	bases	and	storage	of	nuclear	weapons	in	their	
territory	 during	 peace,	with	 Sweden	 as	 a	 neutral	 state	 and	with	 Finland	
connected	with	the	Soviet	Union	by	the	1948	Finnish-Soviet	treaty.
5	 As	demonstrated	by	a	 1994	report	of	 the	 so-called	Neutrality	Commission	ap-
pointed	by	the	Swedish	parliament	to	examine	the	neutrality	policy	during	the	
Cold	War.	See	Olof	Santesson,	Neutralitetspolitiken	i	praktiken,	in	Kungl Krigs-
vetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift,	issue	1,	Stockholm	2012,	p.	157-160.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
4/
20
13
12
challenges	posed	by	global	phenomena	such	as	terrorism	or	crises	
in	 failed	 states.	 In	accordance	with	 this	definition,	sweden be-
came	active in international crisis management.	A	relatively	
small	and	peripheral	country,	Sweden	has	been	using	this	activ-
ity	to	build	up	an	image	of	itself	as	a	state	with	a	much	stronger	
position	and	influence	(both	in	the	EU	and	globally)	than	the	size	
of	the	Swedish	state,	economy	or	population	would	suggest.	Since	
the	 1990s,	 Sweden	 has	 pursued	 this	 crisis	 management	 policy	
within	 the	 framework	provided	by	NATO,	and	 later	also	by	 the	
EU,	which	largely	replaced	the	country’s	original	practice	of	par-
ticipating	in	UN	missions.	Sweden	joined	NATO’s	Partnership	for	
Peace	programme	in	1994.	It	took	part	in	NATO’s	IFOR	and	SFOR	
operations	 in	 the	Balkans	 in	 the	 1990s.	Currently	 it	 is	 still	par-
ticipating	in	NATO’s	KFOR	operation	in	Kosovo	and	in	ISAF	in	Af-
ghanistan.	It	was	also	actively	involved	in	the	Unified	Protector	
operation	in	Libya	in	2011.	From	Sweden’s	point	of	view,	it	is	NATO	
that	offers	the	most	developed	command	structures	and	capabili-
ties	to	carry	out	military	crisis	management	operations.	
The	 end	of	 the	Cold	War	 also	marked	 the	beginning	 of	sweden’s 
shift away from the policy of neutrality.	In	1992	the	Swedish	par-
liament	adopted	a	doctrine	of	non-alignment,	under	which	Sweden	
would	stay	out	of	military	alliances,	and	which	made	neutrality	in	
the	event	of	war	just	one	of	the	options	available	to	the	Swedish	gov-
ernment.	 Further	 evolution	of	Sweden’s	policy	was	 influenced	by	
the	progress	of	political	and	economic	integration	in	Europe	and	in	
the	region,	and	the	debates	on	the	‘solidarity	clause’	and	the	‘defence	
clause’,	first	mentioned	during	work	on	the	EU	constitutional	trea-
ty,	and	ultimately	embodied	in	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon6.	The	notion	of	
‘neutrality’	gradually	disappeared	from	the	rhetoric	of	the	Swedish	
government	and	official	documents,	and	the	2004	security	strategy	
6	 Although	under	the	 ‘defence	clause’	 (Art.	42(7))	 the	provisions	on	aid	and	
assistance	by	all	means	 in	 the	countries’	power	 in	 the	event	of	 an	armed	
aggression	on	any	Member	State	of	the	EU	“shall	not	prejudice	the	specific	
character	of	the	security	and	defence	policy	of	certain	Member	States”,	that	
is,	including	Sweden.	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
4/
20
13
13
stated:	“It	is	hard	to	imagine	that	Sweden	would	stay	neutral	in	the	
event	of	an	armed	attack	against	another	EU	member	state”7.	
The	activities	of	Russia	in	the	Nordic-Baltic	region	(the	resumption	
of	 strategic	 bomber	flights	 in	 the	High	North,	 cyber-attacks	 and	
protests	over	the	removal	of	the	Bronze	Soldier	monument	in	Es-
tonia)	triggered	a	process	of	re-evaluations of sweden’s security 
policy.	 However,	 the	 psychological	 breakthrough	 occurred	 only	
with	the	russian-georgian war of 2008,	which	came	as	a	shock	to	
Sweden.	The	country	started	to	attach	a	greater	significance	to	the	
changes	taking	place	in	its	neighbourhood	(so-called	närområdet),	
especially	in	the	regions	of	the	Baltic	Sea	and	the	High	North	in-
cluding	the	Barents	Sea	and	the	Arctic.	In	the	Baltic	Sea	region,	the	
volume	of	energy	resource	transports	is	increasing	(Nord	Stream,	
LNG,	oil),	and	there	is	potential	for	destabilisation	in	Estonia	and	
Latvia,	due	to	these	states’	large	Russian-speaking	minorities,	and	
throughout	the	region	due	to	possible	Russian	reactions	to	the	de-
velopment	of	NATO’s	missile	defence	system.	In	the	High	North,	on	
the	other	hand,	new	possibilities	are	opening	up	for	the	extraction	
and	 transportation	 of	 energy	 resources,	 for	 maritime	 transport	
and	for	fishing.	In	this	context,	the	rise	of	Russia’s	power	ambitions,	
the	reform	of	the	Russian	Armed	Forces,	the	lowering	of	the	thresh-
old	for	the	use	of	force	by	Russia	and	the	modernisation	of	Russia’s	
military	potential	in	the	Kaliningrad	oblast	(air	and	missile	defence	
systems,	a	prospective	missile	system)	and	in	the	Kola	Peninsula	
are	a	source	of	concern.	Sweden’s	2009	security	strategy	notes	that	
while	a	direct	armed	attack	against	Sweden	or	other	countries	in	
the	region	is	unlikely,	one	cannot	rule	out	the	emergence	of	crises	
in	the	future	in	which	military	measures	may	be	used	either	in	the	
region,	or	against	Sweden	directly8.	
7	 Gunila	Herolf,	Sweden	and	ESDP,	 in	Klaus	Brummer	(ed.),	The	North	and	
ESDP.	The	Baltic	States,	Denmark,	Finland	and	Sweden,	Bertelsmann	Stif-
tung,	Gutersloh	June	2007.
8	 Swedish	 government,	 Regeringens	 proposition	 2008/2009:140,	 Ett	 an-
vändbart	 försvar,	 19	 March	 2009,	 http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/
c6/12/29/57/853ca644.pdf
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ii. From deFending territory  
to exPeditionary missions
The	shift	from	neutrality	to	non-alignment,	combined	with	a	pol-
icy	of	active	international	involvement,	was	accompanied	by	re-
forms	aimed	at	transforming	the	Swedish	Armed	Forces	into	an	
expeditionary	force.	As	a	result	of	this,	however,	the	Swedish	mil-
itary’s	capabilities	to	defend	its	territory	were	diminished.	
during the cold War, while	Sweden	remained	neutral,	the	coun-
try	had	to	build up capabilities to independently defend its ter-
ritory against	potential	armed	aggression.	In	the	event	of	a	war	
in	Europe,	Warsaw	Pact	forces	would	have	gained	most	by	quickly	
seizing	Swedish	territory	and	moving	its	armies	to	northern	and	
southern	Norway.	The	Swedish	Armed	Forces	therefore	had	to	be	
strong	enough	to	defend	Sweden’s	neutrality	(in	reality,	pending	
the	 arrival	 of	 assistance	 from	NATO).	 This	 required	maintain-
ing	 large	armed	forces	and	universal	conscription,	considerable	
defence	 capabilities,	 and	 independence	 from	 external	 supplies	
of	 armament	 and	military	 equipment.	 Sweden	 also	 applied	 the	
concept	 of	 so-called	 total	 defence,	which	 involved	 civilian	 bod-
ies	in	defence	of	the	country.	While	Sweden	did	participate	in	UN	
operations	during	the	Cold	War,	these	were	very	low-priority	in	
comparison	with	defending	the	country,	from	the	point	of	view	of	
the	development	of	the	armed	forces.	
after the end of the cold War, Sweden	 stuck	with	 the	 armed	
forces	model	 focused	on	defending	 its	 territory	until	 the	end	of	
the	1990s,	as,	according	to	its	analysts,	future	developments	in	the	
post-Soviet	area	and	the	Baltic	states	seemed	uncertain.	But	after	
1999,	when	the	Central	European	countries	became	NATO	mem-
bers,	 the	Baltic	 states	were	on	 their	way	 towards	accession	and	
both	groups	of	states	were	negotiating	their	accession	to	the	Eu-
ropean	Union,	Sweden	declared	a	strategic	timeout.	It	started	to	
reduce	the	size	of	its	armed	forces,	made	cuts	in	defence	spending	
and	launched military reforms.	The	first	phase	of	those	reforms	
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took	place	in	the	years	2000–2004,	and	were	aimed	primarily	at	
reducing	troop	numbers.	Implementing	the	objectives	laid	down	
in	the	Defence	Decision	of	20049,	the	Swedish	Ministry	of	Defence	
started	 the	 second	 phase	 of	 transformation,	which	 lasted	 from	
2005	 to	2009,	and	were	clearly	aimed	at	 transforming	 the	Swe-
dish	Armed	Forces	in	line	with	the	expeditionary force model.	
These	reforms	were	aimed	at	giving	the	armed	forces	capability	to	
carry	out	 tasks	 in	 international	operations,	while	defence	tasks	
were	regarded	as	being	of	secondary	importance.	The	EU’s	Nor-
dic	Battle	Group	(NBG)	created	at	that	time,	of	which	Sweden	has	
been	the	framework	nation	since	2008,	provided	an	instrument	
(and	a	blueprint)	 for	 the	 transformation10.	Apart	 from	reducing	
the	number	of	troops,	 the	transformation	was	also	aimed	at	ex-
panding	 the	Swedish	Armed	Forces’	 capability	 to	 participate	 in	
military	co-operation,	and	thus	to	enhance	their	interoperability	
in	EU,	NATO	and	UN	missions.	Sweden	also	started	to	step	up	its	
involvement	in	training	and	exercises	within	NATO	and	the	EU,	
as	well	as	in	bilateral	and	multilateral	formats11.	
the russian-georgian war of august 2008 prompted swe-
dish politicians to revise their thinking about the strate-
gic timeout.	 In	 the	 2009	Defence	Decision12,	 the	 Swedish	 gov-
ernment	 put	 the	 task	 of	 safeguarding	 territorial	 integrity	 and	
9	 Defence	Decision	 (Försvarsbeslut):	a	 security	strategy	adopted	by	 the	Swe-
dish	government	and	parliament	every	four	to	five	years,	the	provisions	of	
which	constitute	guidelines	for	the	implementation	of	security	and	defence	
policies	and	reform	of	the	armed	forces.	
10	 The	NBG	is	deployed	on	a	regular	basis;	it	had	its	first	tour	of	duty	in	2008,	
then	in	2011,	and	is	planned	to	be	on	duty	again	in	2015.	The	Swedish	contri-
bution	to	the	NBG	consist	of	1600	troops	(of	a	total	of	2200).	The	NBG	also	
includes	Finland,	Estonia,	Ireland	and	Norway.
11	 Speech	by	General	Sverker	Göranson,	the	Supreme	Commander	of	the	Swe-
dish	Armed	Forces,	at	the	National	Defence	Academy	in	Beijing,	20	May	2012,	
http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/upload/dokumentfiler/tal/2012/120320%20
NDU%20Peking.pdf	
12	 Swedish	 government,	 Regeringens	 proposition	 2008/2009:140,	 Ett	 an-
vändbart	 försvar,	 19	 March	 2009,	 http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/
c6/12/29/57/853ca644.pdf
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
4/
20
13
16
political	 sovereignty	on	a	par	with	participation	 in	crisis	man-
agement	operations.	Traditional	threats	and	new	types	of	chal-
lenges	(such	as	cyber-security)	were	given	more	prominence	in	
the	 broad	 definition	 of	 national	 security,	 and	 Sweden’s	 neigh-
bourhood	 (närområdet)	was	made	 the	main	 frame	of	 reference.	
The	government	also	obligated	the	Armed	Forces	to	resume	de-
fence	planning,	which	had	been	abandoned	several	years	before13.	
At	the	same	time,	however,	the	previous	plans	for	the	transfor-
mation	of	 the	military	did	not	undergo	any	major	adjustments.	
A	reform	program	was	proposed	for	the	years	2010–2014,	whose	
provisions	included	the	professionalisation	of	the	Armed	Forces	
as	of	July	2010.	These	changes,	introduced	in	the	direct	aftermath	
of	 the	Russian-Georgian	war,	concerned	supplying	more	arma-
ment	and	military	equipment	 to	 several	 reserve	units,	 and	 the	
reintroduction	as	of	2013	of	four	regional	commands	(dissolved	in	
the	1990s),	whose	task	was	to	carry	out	joint	operations	and	co-	
-ordinate	 military	 and	 civilian	 activities	 in	 the	 individual	 re-
gions	of	Sweden.	
13	 Karin	Enström,	S	monterade	ned	försvaret,	Dalarnas Tidningar,	23	January	
2013,	 http://www.dt.se/opinion/kronikor/1.5508508-s-monterade-ned-for-
svaret	
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iii. sWeden declares solidarity
The	consequence	of	 increased	 intraregional	 links,	 the	 transfor-
mation	of	the	Swedish	military	into	an	expeditionary	force,	and	
the	 perceived	 deterioration	 of	 regional	 security	 led	 to	 the	 revi-
sion	of	Sweden’s	security	policy	and	its	break	with	the	tradition	
of	non-involvement	and	 independence	 in	 its	defence	policy.	The	
text	of	the	Defence	Decision	for	2010-2014	adopted	in	March	2009	
included	a	‘declaration of solidarity’. In	that	document	Sweden	
unilaterally	declared	that	it	would	not	remain	passive	in	the	event	
of	a	“disaster	or	armed	aggression”	affecting	one	of	the	EU	mem-
bers	or	a	Nordic	state	(i.e.	Norway	or	Iceland),	and	that	it	expected	
those	countries	to	do	the	same.	The	declaration	further	stipulated	
that	the	Swedish	Armed	Forces	had	to	be	prepared	to	give	and	re-
ceive	military	assistance.	The	Swedish	government	declared	that	
Sweden’s	 security	would	 be	 founded	 on	 solidarity	 and	 interde-
pendence	with	the	countries	mentioned	(de facto	meaning	NATO),	
and	that	an	armed	attack	against	one	country	in	the	region	would	
in	fact	mean	its	neighbours	becoming	involved	in	the	conflict.	
sweden’s declaration was both an expression of geopolitical 
necessity and an attempt to solve the problem of ensuring the 
country’s security in the face of perceived rising instability 
in the region. On	the	one	hand,	the	‘declaration	of	solidarity’	(or	
in	fact	‘non-passivity’)	amounted	to	recognition	of	the	actual	state	
of	affairs.	It	is	unlikely	that	political	considerations	would	allow	
Sweden	to	adopt	a	neutral	position	in	the	event	of	an	armed	attack	
on	 another	Nordic	 or	 EU	 country.	 Likewise,	 it	would	 be	hardly	
possible	for	Sweden	to	stand	aside	in	such	a	case	due	to	military	
considerations.	In	the	scenarios	of	possible	crises	and	conflicts	in	
Northern	Europe	which	Swedish	analysts	had	considered	(such	as	
a	conflict	between	the	Baltic	States	and	Russia)14,	NATO’s	actions	
14	 Karlis	 Neretnieks,	 Military-Strategic	 Options,	 in	 Bo	 Hugemark	 (ed.),	
Friends	in	Need.	Towards	a	Swedish	Strategy	of	Solidarity	with	her	Neigh-
bours,	Stockholm	2012,	p.	175-220.
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in	the	region	would	require	Sweden	to	make	available	its	air	space,	
territorial	waters	or	land.	On	the	other	hand,	the	expectation	of	
solidarity	from	the	other	Nordic	and	EU	states	was	equally	impor-
tant	for	the	Swedish	government,	because	the	transformation	of	
its	military	into	an	expeditionary	force	and	its	growing	involve-
ment	in	foreign	operations	had	resulted	in	Sweden’s	diminished	
capabilities	to	defend	its	territory.
sweden’s adoption of the ‘declaration of solidarity’ coincided 
with a stepping-up of military co-operation with the nordic 
states and nato in northern europe. 
Exercises	 by	 individual	 branches	 of	 the	 armed	 forces	 have	 be-
come	an	important	element	of	the	nordic defence co-operation 
(NORDEFCO)	 launched	 in	 2009.	 This	 particularly	 concerns	 the	
air	forces:	exercises	have	taken	place	in	the	High	North	(involv-
ing	 Sweden,	 Norway	 and	 Finland);	 exercises	will	 take	 place	 in	
southern	Sweden	and	northern	Denmark	(involving	Sweden	and	
Denmark,	as	agreed	in	November	2012)15;	and	Sweden	also	plans	
to	 participate	 (together	with	 Finland)	 in	 cooperation	with	Nor-
way	in	NATO’s	Icelandic	Air	Policing	and	Surveillance	mission16.	
Those	activities	are	aimed	at	increasing	Sweden’s	interoperability	
with	its	neighbours	(NATO	members)	who	share	its	understand-
ing	of	security	challenges,	and	to	strengthen	the	region’s	defence	
capabilities	and	the	potential	‘Nordic	solidarity’	in	the	event	of	an	
external	threat.	
15	 NORDEFCO,	Cross-border	cooperation,	27	December	2012,	www.nordefco.org	
16	 Sweden	and	Finland	agreed	to	participate,	in	co-operation	with	Norway,	
in	 the	 surveillance	 of	 Iceland’s	 air	 space,	 but	 not	 in	 policing	 it;	 that	 is,	
they	will	 not	 intercept	 aircraft	 violating	 Icelandic	 air	 space.	 In	 Sweden	
and	Finland,	the	decision	is	referred	to	as	the	development	of	the	Nordic	
air	force	exercise	programme	and	as	part	of	Nordic	co-operation,	rather	
than	participation	in	a	NATO	mission,	and	consequently	the	Swedish	and	
Finnish	fighter	aircraft	will	probably	be	unarmed.	This	‘exercise’	is	sched-
uled	for	the	first	quarter	of	2014.
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Sweden	has	also	started	to	step	up	its	involvement in nato ex-
ercises and operations.	While	 the	development	of	military	co-
operation	 (in	 the	beginning	 involving	 the	Swedish	Army	alone)	
had	 originally	 been	 aimed	 at	 improving	 interoperability	 with	
a	view	 to	 taking	part	 in	 foreign	operations,	 after	2009	regional	
collaboration	 increasingly	 became	 the	 point	 of	 reference.	 The	
Swedish	Armed	Forces	started	to	 take	part	more	 frequently	 in	
Partnership	for	Peace	and	NATO	exercises	in	the	region,	for	ex-
ample,	in	Loyal	Arrow	in	Sweden	in	2009,	NRF	Brilliant	Mari-
ner	in	2010,	Baltic	Regional	Training	Event	in	the	Baltic	States	in	
2011	and	2012,	and	the	CMX	crisis	management	exercises	in	2011	
and	2012.	The	Swedish	Navy	and	Air	Force	also	started	to	take	
part	in	EU	and	NATO	operations:	the	Navy	joined	the	operation	
in	the	Horn	of	Africa	in	2009,	and	the	Air	Force	took	part	in	the	
operation	in	Libya	in	2011.	Co-operation	with	NATO	was	seen	as	
a	way	to	develop	interoperability	with	the	forces	of	NATO	mem-
bers	and	the	NATO	command	structures.	Sweden	treated	this	as	
an	investment	in	‘joint	defence	capabilities’.	It	was	also	expect-
ed	to	raise	political	capital	for	Sweden	within	NATO	and	in	the	
United	States,	and	in	this	way	gain	additional	guarantees	for	the	
country’s	 security	 despite	 Sweden	not	 being	 a	NATO	member.	
Because	 of	 its	 active	 involvement	 in	 co-operation	with	NATO,	
Sweden	even	started	to	be	dubbed	“NATO’s	partner	number	one”	
or	“Ally	twenty-nine”17.	
17	 Ann-Sofie	Dahl,	 Partner	 number	 one	 or	NATO	 ally	 twenty-nine.	 Sweden	
and	NATO	post-Libya,	Research	Paper	No.	82,	NATO	Defense	College,	Sep-
tember	2012,	http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=1
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iV. sWeden’s deFence Policy in crisis 
nevertheless, the ‘declaration of solidarity’ began to be per-
ceived in sweden as an illusory solution to the problem of 
ensuring military security. In	the	context	of	the	reform	of	the	
Russian	Armed	Forces	and	Russia’s	espionage	activities	in	North-
ern	Europe,	Swedish	analysts	started	to	look	into	the	defence	ca-
pabilities	of	the	Swedish	Armed	Forces,	its	ability	to	give	and	re-
ceive	military	assistance,	and	the	political	credibility	of	the	policy	
of	 solidarity.	 Their	 conclusions	 reveal	 an	 ambivalent	 picture	 of	
the	military.	The	audit	of	the	Armed	Forces’	ability	to	accomplish	
their	 tasks,	which	was	carried	out	 in	2012	by	analysts	 from	the	
Royal	Swedish	Academy	of	War	Sciences,	presents	a	dual	picture18.
The	 transformation	 into	 an	 expeditionary	 force	 capable	 of	 re-
sponding	 flexibly	 to	 various	 kinds	 of	 challenges	 in	 crisis	man-
agement	operations,	which	has	been	underway	for	several	years,	
is	generally	regarded	to	have	been	a	success.	sweden currently 
possesses a military force that can be deployed on foreign 
missions, and has both high-quality armament and military 
equipment and well-trained troops.	 This	 was	 demonstrated	
by	Sweden’s	participation	in	foreign	missions:	its	Army	has	been	
deployed	in	Afghanistan	as	part	of	NATO’s	ISAF,	its	Navy	in	the	
Horn	of	Africa	as	part	of	the	EU’s	Atalanta	operation,	and	its	Air	
Force	in	Libya	as	part	of	NATO’s	Unified	Protector	operation.	The	
analysts	concluded	that	the	direction	of	change,	towards	a	small-
er	 and	 technologically	more	 advance	military,	was	 in	 principle	
correct,	in	the	context	of	the	transformations	of	the	neighbouring	
countries’	armed	forces.	
18	 Björn	Anderson	(ed.),	Kan	vi	försvara	oss? (Can	we	defend	ourselves?),	Re-
port	prepared	as	part	of	the	project	‘Security	of	Sweden	beyond	2014’	carried	
out	by	the	Royal	Academy	of	War	Sciences	(KKrVA),	Stockholm	2012;	Kar-
lis	Neretnieks,	Military-Strategic	Options,	 in	Bo	Hugemark	 (ed.),	 Friends	
in	Need.	 Towards	 a	 Swedish	 Strategy	 of	 Solidarity	with	 her	Neighbours,	
Stockholm	2012,	p.	175-220.
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At	the	same	time,	however,	serious	doubts have been expressed 
about the swedish armed Forces’ ability to fulfil tasks re-
lated to defending sweden’s territory and carry out effec-
tive operations in the event of crises or conflicts in the re-
gion.	 Firstly,	 research	 by	 the	 Royal	 Academy	 of	War	 Sciences19	
showed	 that	while	 the	Swedish	Armed	Forces	were	prepared	 to	
co-operate	with	NATO	in	case	of	low-intensity	crises,	they	would	
face	mounting	 problems	 as	 the	 crises	 escalated,	 for	 instance	 if	
Swedish	territory	were	to	be	used	to	establish	bases	for	a	NATO	
operation	to	support	the	Baltic	states,	and	Sweden	faced	the	risk	
of	 a	 pre-emptive	 strike	 from	 Russia	 aimed	 at	 creating	 political	
pressure	and/or	destroying	military	infrastructures.	In	the	case	
of	the	Army,	the	problems	include	the	absence	of	medium-range	
air	 (and	missile)	 defence	 systems,	 and	 difficulties	with	 deploy-
ing	a	larger	number	of	adequately	trained	personnel.	The	use	of	
the	Navy	 (for	example,	 to	escort	 larger	units)	would	be	 limited,	
as	Swedish	corvettes	lack	systems	of	air	defence.	The	operations	
of	the	Air	Force,	Sweden’s	biggest	asset,	would	be	limited	by	the	
absence	of	long-range	air	to	surface	missiles	(and	the	need	to	take	
over	the	tasks	of	medium-range	land-based	air	defence	systems).	
Even	though	Sweden	has	been	working	together	with	NATO,	co-
-operation	and	co-ordination	between	the	Swedish	Armed	Forces	
and	NATO	forces	on	Swedish	territory	and	beyond	could	also	pose	
problems.	Besides,	the	Swedish	Armed	Forces	have	too	few	units	
to	defend	the	country’s	territory	independently	over	an	extended	
period	of	time,	and	do	not	have	all	the	necessary	armament	and	
military	equipment.	In	the	event	of	an	isolated	pre-emptive	strike	
against	Swedish	territory	(such	as	on	one	of	 the	major	cities,	or	
a	strategically	important	region	such	as	Gotland),	designed	to	im-
pair	Sweden’s	and	NATO’s	military	potential	in	the	region,	Swe-
den	would	not	be	able	to	defend	itself	over	an	extended	period	of	
time,	 and	would	have	 to	 rely	on	external	 assistance.	 In	Decem-
ber	2012,	General	Sverker	Göranson,	Supreme	Commander	of	the	
Swedish	Armed	Forces,	confirmed	as	much	when	he	said	that	in	
19	 Björn	Anderson	(ed.),	op. cit.
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the	event	of	a	limited	armed	attack,	Sweden	would	be	able	to	de-
fend	itself	for	a	week,	and	even	that	only	as	of	2019,	when	all	the	
branches	of	the	Armed	Forces	become	fully	operational	after	the	
current	reform20.	
the causes of this state of affairs include excessive cuts to the 
size of the armed Forces over the last ten years (see	Appendix	1), 
and the recent abolition of universal conscription and the 
professionalisation of the military, which	currently	results	in	
personnel	shortages.	 In	accordance	with	the	stated	objectives	of	
the	recent	reform,	Sweden’s	Army	is	to	achieve	the	full	number	
of	troops	and	the	target	level	of	training	only	in	2019.	Meanwhile,	
a	 report	 by	 Sweden’s	 Riksrevisionen,	 the	 national	 audit	 office,	
shows	that	the	Swedish	Air	Force	and	Navy	are	struggling	with	
long-term	structural	problems	with	manning	 their	units,	 espe-
cially	the	combat	units21.	Furthermore,	the	Armed	Forces	are	un-
derfinanced	which,	according	to	the	Supreme	Commander,	may	
in	 future	 even	 result	 in	 Sweden	 giving	 up	 one	 of	 the	 branches	
of	 its	Armed	Forces22.	After	a	period	of	declining	military	spen-
ding,	Sweden	started	to	expand	its	defence	budget	in	2009.	Mili-
tary	spending	 is	expected	 to	slightly	 increase	 in	absolute	 terms	
in	the	coming	years	(currently	it	stands	at	around	US$6.2	billion;	
see	 Appendix	 2).	 However,	 given	 Sweden’s	 projected	 econo-
mic	 growth,	 the	 proportion	 of	 GDP	 earmarked	 for	 defence	will	
de facto	 decrease	 to	 around	 1%23.	 The	 slight	 expansion	 of	 the	
20	 Mikael	Holmström,	Försvar	med	tidsgräns,	Svenska Dagbladet,	30	December	
2012,	http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/forsvar-med-tidsgrans_7789308.
svd;	Mikael	Holmström,	Det	är	något	helt	exceptionellt,	Svenska Dagbladet,	
25	 January	 2013,	 http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/det-ar-nagot-helt-ex-
ceptionellt_7858986.svd
21	 Riksrevisionen,	 Bemanningen	 av	 marines	 och	 flygvapnets	 stående	 in-
satsförband,	 RIR	 2012:18,	 November	 2012,	 http://www.riksrevisionen.se/
PageFiles/16556/Anpassad_12_18_Bemanningen%20av%20marinens%20
och%20flygvapnets%20st%C3%A5ende%20insatsf%C3%B6rband.pdf	
22	 See	footnote	20.	
23	 Peter	Nordlund,	Janne	Åkerström,	Försvarsutgifter	i	budgetkrisens	spår	–	
en	försvarsekonomisk	omvärldsanalys,	FOI	Report,	October	2012,	p.	55–56,	
http://www.foi.se/Documents/foir3508.pdf	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
4/
20
13
23
defence	budget	will	probably	be	 insufficient	 to	 cover	 the	neces-
sary	expenses	after	2015.	The	military	will	have	to	deal	not	only	
with	the	shortages	of	armament	and	military	equipment,	includ-
ing	the	land-based	air	defence	systems,	artillery	systems,	air	de-
fence	 systems	 for	 the	 corvettes	 and	 ammunition	 for	 the	 JAS-39	
fighter	aircraft.	The	Swedish	Armed	Forces	will	also	face	consid-
erable	investment	needs	in	the	2015–2018	planning	period	and	will	
require	around	30	billion	Swedish	kronor,	i.e.	around	€3.5	billion,	
of	 addi	tional	 financing	 over	 the	 period	 in	 question.	 In	 January	
2013	the	Swedish	government	decided	to	purchase	60	new	multi-	
-role	 JAS-39E/F	 fighter	 aircraft.	 That	 purchase	 will	 consume	
most	 of	 the	 investment	 budget	 in	 the	 coming	 years,	 while	 the	
Armed	Forces	also	need	to	replace	their	fleet	of	transport	aircraft	
(currently	the	C-130E)	and	submarines,	replace/upgrade	their	in-
fantry	fighting	vehicles,	and	purchase	UAVs24.	
Those	reports,	in	conjunction	with	the	statement	by	NATO’s	Sec-
retary	General,	who	said	in	November	2012	that	the	Alliance	was	
not	responsible	for	the	security	of	countries	that	were	not	its	mem-
bers25,	gave	rise	to	the most heated discussions since the end of 
the cold War among analysts, the military and politicians, 
who have been arguing about sweden’s defence policy and 
the direction of the military reform.	The	NATO	Secretary	Gen-
eral’s	statement	undermined	the	Swedish	government’s	rhetoric	
that	there	existed	a	 ‘solidarity’	with	Sweden	(supposedly	on	the	
part	of	NATO).	The	Norwegian	defence	minister	made	a	statement	
in	a	similar	tone,	making	it	clear	that	Norway	would	be	unlikely	
to	grant	military	assistance	to	Sweden	in	the	event	of	a	conflict,	
because	its	primary	objective	was	to	defend	its	own	territory,	and	
24	 Gerard	O’Dwyer,	Norway	Bucks	Trend	as	Neighbors	Curb	Spending,	Defense 
News,	24	October	2012,	http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121024/DE-
FREG01/310240001/Norway-Bucks-Trend-Neighbors-Curb-Spending	
25	 Interview	with	Anders	Fogh	Rasmussen	during	his	visit	to	Sweden,	Sverige	
kan	 inte	räkna	med	stöd	från	Nato,	6	November	2012,	http://www.svt.se/
nyheter/sverige/nato-syrien-storsta-utmaning
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because	NATO	was	 its	main	military	alliance26.	The	debate	was	
further	heated	up	by	reports	that	Sweden’s	internal	security	ser-
vices	were	investigating,	at	the	request	of	the	prosecutor’s	office,	
whether	the	Supreme	Commander	had	not	committed	an	offence	
by	making	a	statement	about	Sweden’s	defence	capabilities,	and	in	
this	way	revealing	information	that	could	compromise	the	coun-
try’s	security.	In	early	2013	the	press	joined	the	debate,	which	cre-
ated	heightened	media	interest	in	defence	issues	that	had	had	no	
precedent	in	many	years.	
Those	 discussions	 are	 of	 major	 significance	 –	 in	 2014	 Sweden	
will	 hold	 parliamentary	 elections,	 and	 in	 2015	 the	 government	
and	parliament	are	to	adopt	a	new	Defence	Decision	for	the	years	
2015–2018,	 which	 may	 influence	 future	 military	 and	 political	
transformations.	A	strong	polarisation	over	defence	policy	issues	
is	symptomatic	here.	On	the	one	hand,	analysts,	the	military	and	
some	politicians	(from	the	smaller	Liberal	and	Christian	Demo-
crat	parties	that	are	part	of	the	conservative-liberal	government)	
have	been	pointing	to	the	consequences	of	the	Armed	Forces’	un-
derfinancing,	 calling	 for	 considerably	 higher	 defence	 spending	
and	adjustments	to	the	military	reform	(including	the	purchase	
of	medium-range	air	and	missile	defence	system),	and	urging	the	
start	of	a	serious	debate	about	possible	accession	to	NATO.	They	
have	also	been	pointing	to	the	growing	threat	posed	by	an	increas-
ingly	unstable	and	ever	better-armed	Russia.	On	the	other	hand,	
the	 largest	coalition	party	(the	Moderates)	and	its	 leader,	Prime	
Minister	Fredrik	Reinfeldt,	who	bear	in	mind	the	consolidation	of	
public	finances	and	the	parliamentary	election	campaign	in	2014,	
have	been	refusing	to	consider	increasing	defence	spending	at	the	
expense	of	other	objectives	(such	as	welfare).	The	Moderates	(as	
well	as	the	opposition	Social	Democrats)	are	aware	of	the	disqui-
eting	trends	in	Russian	politics	and	the	country’s	growing	defence	
26	 Interview	with	Anne-Grete	Strøm-Erichsen,	Osäkert	om	Norge	ställer	upp	
om	Sverige	angrips,	Sveriges	Radio,	24	February	2013,	http://sverigesradio.
se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=5453467	
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spending,	but	recently	have	been	playing	down	their	direct	 im-
pact	on	Sweden’s	military	security.	The	 temperature	of	 the	dis-
cussion	is	well	illustrated	by	headlines	in	Sweden’s	major	papers,	
one	of	which	read	“Sweden	needs	a	military	putsch”27.
27	 Sverige	behöver	en	militärkupp,	Expressen,	15	January	2013,	http://www.ex-
pressen.se/ledare/sverige-behover-en-militarkupp-1/	
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V. sWeden’s dilemmas
sweden thus faces a major challenge of how to shape its de-
fence policy in a deteriorating regional security setting.	Sev-
eral	solutions	are	being	debated,	all	of	which	involve	political	and	
social	problems	stemming	largely	from	Swedish	identity	and	his-
tory.	The	most	important	dilemma	concerns	the	choice	between	
remaining	a	non-aligned	state	and	joining	NATO,	although	other	
proposals	have	also	been	raised.
(1) remaining outside nato is	one	option	which	nevertheless	
would	lead	to	increased	military	spending	and	defence	capabili-
ties,	in	line	with	the	reasoning	that	non-involvement	in	military	
alliances	 entails	 an	 obligation	 to	 put	more	 effort	 into	 ensuring	
one’s	own	security.	However,	the	largest	coalition	party,	the	Mode	-	
rates,	is	unwilling	to	increase	the	defence	budget	considerably,	as	
its	priority	now	is	 to	maintain	budgetary	discipline,	even	 if	 the	
smaller	coalition	partners	(the	Liberals	and	the	Christian	Demo-
crats)	support	increasing	defence	spending.	The	opposition	is	also	
split	 on	 the	 issue	–	 the	Social	Democrats	have	not	 ruled	out	 in-
creased	spending,	while	the	Greens	are	critical	of	it28.
(2) Joining nato:	 in	 terms	 of	 Sweden’s	 domestic	 politics,	 this	
would	be	a	very	difficult	process,	and	carrying	it	out	while	con-
forming	with	 Swedish	 political	 culture	would	 require	 building	
a	 political	 consensus	 of	 a	majority	 of	 parliamentary	 parties,	 as	
well	 as	 a	massive	 public	 campaign.	 Sweden’s	major	 parties	 are	
split	on	the	issue,	and	even	those	that	are	in	favour	of	NATO	mem-
bership	(including	the	Moderates)	have	no	political	will	to	raise	
this	unpopular	 issue	with	 the	public.	Advocates	of	membership	
argue	that	Sweden	would	gain	additional	guarantees	of	security	
and	 could	 expect	 assistance	 from	 its	 allies.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
28	 Swedish	Government	Split	Over	Defence	Spending,	Swedish	Radio,	18	Janu-
ary	2013,	http://www.defencetalk.com/swedish-government-split-over-de-
fence-spending-46387/#.UP-dEuHI4Ui.twitter	
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opponents	(including	the	Social	Democrats)	believe	that	member-
ship	would	lead	to	rising	tensions	and	a	greater	risk	of	crises	in	
the	Baltic	Sea	region	and	the	High	North29.	They	also	argue	that	
even	if	Sweden	opted	for	NATO	membership,	it	would	still	need	
to	 increase	defence	spending	 in	order	 to	be	regarded	as	a	relia-
ble	member	of	the	Alliance.	The	negative	attitude	of	the	Swedish	
public	 is	also	an	 important	 factor	 in	the	membership	debate.	 In	
a	2012	survey,	47%	of	Swedes	favoured	staying	out	of	NATO,	with	
30%	backing	accession30.	The	Swedish	people	still	widely	believe	
that	 non-alignment	 is	 the	 best	 guarantee	 of	 security,	 and	 that	
membership	in	NATO	would	entail	excessive	financial	and	politi-
cal	commitments.	This	shows	how	the	concept	of	neutrality	has	
become	a	defining	element	of	the	Swedish	national	identity,	and	
has	 turned	 from	an	effective	policy	 instrument	 into	a	brake	on	
major	change.	Sweden	should	therefore	not	be	expected	to	file	an	
application	for	membership	in	NATO	in	the	immediate	future.	
Still,	the	fact	that	NATO	has	been	looking	for	new	and	diversified	
formulas	 for	 co-operation	with	 its	most	 active	 partners,	which	
could	be	applied	after	the	period	of	intensive	co-operation	on	the	
Afghanistan	mission	 is	 over,	 offers	 some	 opportunities	 for	 fur-
ther	 rapprochement	 between	 Sweden	 (as	 well	 as	 Finland)	 and	
the	Alliance.	This	would	probably	give	Sweden	broader	opportu-
nities	to	influence	the	shape	of	the	future	operations	in	which	it	
would	choose	to	participate,	as	well	as	more	opportunities	for	ex-
change	of	information	and	co-ordination	with	regard	to	the	new	
challenges	 such	 as	 cyber-security,	 energy	 security,	 combating	
terrorism	and	the	proliferation	of	weapons	of	mass	destruction.	
29	 Sven	 Hirdman,	Medlemskap	 i	 Nato	 skulle	 öka	 spanningar,	 Svenska Dag-
bladet,	 16	 January	 2013,	 http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/medlem-
skap-i-nato-skulle-oka-spanningar_7827228.svd
30	 23%	of	respondents	had	no	opinion	on	the	issue.	See	Swedish	Civil	Contin-
gencies	Agency	 (MSB),	Delredovisning	–	Opinioner	2012,	Stockholm	2012,	
p.	22,	https://www.msb.se/Upload/Nyheter_press/Pressmeddelanden/Opi-
nioner2012_Delredovisning.pdf	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
4/
20
13
28
However,	such	closer	co-operation	would	not	extend	to	activities	
under	Article	5	of	the	North	Atlantic	Treaty31.	
(3) Further development of nordic defence co-operation32 
aimed at establishing a military alliance: this	option	is	backed	
by	large	numbers	of	the	Swedish	public.	Co-operation	within	the	
framework	of	NORDEFCO	is	the	first	and	most	natural	option	for	
the	development	of	regional	military	co-operation,	not	only	from	
the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 Sweden,	 but	 also	 for	 Finland	 and	 Norway	
(albeit	less	so	for	Denmark).	The	strategic	proximity,	in	both	the	
regional	and	the	global	dimension,	strongly	underpinned	by	the	
economic	and	cultural	 context,	provides	a	basis	 for	 such	co-op-
eration.	Still,	the	proposal	made	in	the	2009	Stoltenberg	report33,	
for	all	the	Nordic	states	to	adopt	a	mutual	declaration	of	solidar-
ity	as	a	condition	that	military	co-operation	be	further	developed,	
has	been	rejected	by	all	the	Nordic	states.	Because	their	military	
potential	is	relatively	small	in	comparison	with	the	potentials	of	
other	 regional	 players,	 the	Nordic	 states	 are	 unwilling	 to	 limit	
their	 co-operation	 options	 to	 their	 neighbours	 alone.	 Denmark	
and	Norway,	being	NATO	members,	have	ruled	out	the	possibil-
ity	of	Nordic	 co-operation	becoming	 ‘independent’	 and	 forming	
an	alternative	 to	NATO	 in	 the	region.	This	 is	 supposed	 to	 serve	
as	 the	Nordic	 format	for	the	 ‘pooling	&	sharing’	projects,	which	
nevertheless	should	not	impose	any	limitations	on	sovereign	de-
cision-making.	So	far,	Sweden	and	Finland	have	adopted	the	same	
position,	recognising	the	significant	role	that	NATO	plays	in	en-
suring	security	in	Northern	Europe.	However,	it	is	possible	that	
in	order	to	make	up	for	the	shortages	of	 its	own	defence	budget	
and	military	capabilities,	Sweden	will	come	up	with	proposals	for	
31	 See	footnote	17.	
32	 For	more	 information	 on	NORDEFCO,	 see	 Justyna	 Gotkowska,	 Smart	 de-
fence	Nordic	style,	CEWeekly,	19	September	2012,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/ceweekly/2012-09-19/smart-defence-nordic-style	
33	 Justyna	Gotkowska,	Olaf	Osica	(ed.),	Closing	the	gap?	Military	co-operation	
from	the	Baltic	Sea	to	the	Black	Sea,	OSW	Report,	p.	23,	10	December	2012,	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/Closing_the_gap_net.pdf
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closer	regional	co-operation	aimed	at	integrating	the	defence	ca-
pabilities	of	the	Nordic	states.	In	a	joint	article	published	in	Janu-
ary	2013,	Sweden’s	ministers	for	foreign	affairs	and	defence,	Carl	
Bildt	and	Karin	Enström,	stated	that	“jointly	possessing	and	us-
ing	 capabilities	 and	 resources,	 i.e.	 so-called	 pooling	&	 sharing,	
is	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 Sweden’s	 vision	 of	Nordic	 co-operation”34.	
This	 proposal	 goes	 further	 than	 even	 the	most	 advanced	NOR-
DEFCO	projects	have	done	so	 far,	 such	as	 the	 joint	use	of	 trans-
port	aircraft	(NORTAT).	Still,	given	the	relatively	higher	defence	
spending	of	the	other	Nordic	countries,	and	the	possible	implica-
tions	of	the	use	of	joint	capabilities	within	NATO,	the	feasibility	of	
Sweden’s	proposals	should	be	treated	with	caution.	
(4)	 In	the	context	described	above,	proposals	have	also	been	put	
forward	 in	 Sweden	 to	 establish a swedish-Finnish military 
alliance	 based	on	 the	non-aligned	 status	of	both	countries.	Re-
sponding	 to	 those	 proposals,	 the	 Finnish	 minister	 of	 defence	
(from	a	party	representing	the	Swedish	minority)	said	that	clos-
er	Nordic	co-operation	was	a	rather	distant	vision,	which	would	
moreover	require	adequate	treaties	to	be	concluded.	And	consid-
ering	Norway’s	and	Denmark’s	membership	in	NATO,	such	trea-
ties	could	only	involve	Sweden	and	Finland35.	However,	the	Prime	
Minister	of	Finland	expressed	a	clearly	negative	position	on	the	
concept	of	Nordic	or	Swedish-Finnish	military	alliances36.	 Such	
statements	 are	 not	 the	 only	 indications	 that	 a	 Swedish-Finnish	
military	 alliance	 is	 unlikely	 to	materialise.	 The	 Finns	 are	 cau-
tious	about	military	alliances	with	Sweden	for	historical	reasons,	
which	 include	 Sweden’s	 passive	 policy	 during	 Finland’s	War	 of	
34	 Carl	Bildt,	Karin	Enström,	Försvarsmateriel	kan	ägas	gemensamt	i	Norden,	
Dagens Nyheter,	13	January	2013,	http://www.dn.se/debatt/forsvarsmateriel-
kan-agas-gemensamt-i-norden
35	 Finnish	 Broadcasting	 Company	YLE,	 Finnish-Swedish	 defence	 pact	 issue	
raised,	13	January	2013,	http://yle.fi/uutiset/finnish-swedish_defense_pact_	
issue_raised/6449010
36	 Finnish	Broadcasting	Company	YLE,	PM	Katainen:	 ‘No’	 to	Nordic	defence	
pact,	14	January	2013,	http://yle.fi/uutiset/pm_katainen_no_to_nordic_de-
fence_pact/6450309
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Independence	 in	 1917–1918,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 Sweden	 refused	 to	
offer	 military	 assistance	 to	 Finland	 during	 the	 Finnish-Soviet	
Winter	War	of	1939–1940.	Even	though	the	two	countries	had	co-
-operated	militarily	in	the	1930s,	and	Sweden	had	been	discussing	
and	sending	signals	of	solidarity	with	Finland	 in	 the	event	 that	
its	neighbour	came	under	attack	(regarding	this	as	an	‘extended’	
defence	of	Sweden’s	own	territory)37.	
(5)	Sweden	could	also	consider	emulating	the	example	of	Finland38	
and	 strengthening bilateral military co-operation with the 
united states. However,	all	the	dilemmas	involved	in	closer	co-
-operation	with	NATO	would	equally	apply	to	closer	collaboration	
with	the	US.	
on the other hand, sweden is not considering the option of 
developing closer co-operation within the european union.	
Even	though	the	EU	has	adopted	the	‘defence	clause’,	for	Sweden	
the	 EU	 is	 not	 and	will	 not	 be	 a	military	 alliance.	 The	 develop-
ment	of	(civil	and)	military	capabilities	within	the	EU	is	aimed	at	
participation	in	foreign	operations,	and	not	at	collective	defence.	
From	the	point	of	view	of	Sweden,	with	NATO	in	place,	there	is	no	
need	to	develop	EU	command	structures	similar	to	NATO’s	or	to	
create	a	military	alliance	excluding	the	United	States.	
none of the proposed solutions to sweden’s security dilem-
mas is simple or easily practicable for the current ruling coa-
lition. considering the circumstances discussed above, it is 
unlikely that a thorough change of sweden’s defence policy 
will be possible in the medium term. The	reports	of	the	Swedish	
37	 Jacob	Westberg,	Finskt	och	svenskt	försvarssamarbete	under	mellankrigs-
tiden,	in	Fredrik	Doeser,	Magnus	Petersson	and	Jacob	Westberg	(ed.),	Nor-
den	mellan	stormakter	och	fredsförbund,	Stockholm	2012,	p.	95-117.
38	 Mainly	in	the	area	of	armament	and	military	equipment	co-operation.	See	
the	recent	Finnish	orders	for	US-made	state-of-the-art	weapons:	AGM-158	
JASSM	air-to-surface	guided	missiles	with	a	range	of	c.	370	km	for	the	Air	
Force	(F-18	combat	aircraft),	and	the	M57	ATACMS	surface-to-surface	mis-
siles	with	a	range	of	c.	300	km	for	the	Army.
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Defence	Commission,	on	the	basis	of	which	the	government	will	
issue	 the	 new	 Defence	 Decision	 for	 2015–2018,	 will	 be	 however	
of	 considerable	 importance.	 The	Commission,	which	 started	 its	
work	in	2012,	is	tasked	with	assessing	the	evolution	of	the	interna-
tional	security	environment	and	the	threats	and	challenges	that	it	
poses	for	Sweden.	It	will	make	proposals	to	the	government	con-
cerning	changes	 to	 the	defence	policy	and	reform	of	 the	Armed	
Forces,	while	building	broad	inter-party	consensus	on	the	issue.	
In	the	coming	years	Sweden	will	probably	remain	outside	NATO,	
make	 some	adjustments	 to	 its	military	 reform	and	 increase	de-
fence	 spending	 (in	 absolute	 terms),	 provided	 that	 there	 is	 sus-
tained	pressure	to	do	so	from	the	analyst	community,	backed	by	
some	media	and	political	parties.	Besides	that,	it	will	continue	to	
be	involved	in	the	development	of	Nordic	co-operation	(which	will	
nonetheless	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 limitations	 discussed	 above)	 and	
seek	deeper	co-operation	with	NATO.	
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Vi. sWedish deFence Policy and the Baltic 
sea region
For sweden’s partners in the region, the absence of a major 
change in swedish defence policy that would lead towards 
membership in nato means continued uncertainty about 
what the country will do in the event of an actual crisis 
or conflict in the region.	Will	 the	Swedish	government	show	
‘solidarity’	 and	 offer	 assistance,	 should	 any	 such	 scenario	ma-
terialise?	Or	will	the	public’s	deeply	rooted	tendency	not	to	get	
involved	 in	 the	 problems	 of	 Sweden’s	 neighbours	 prevail	 over	
a	formally	declared	‘solidarity’?	Will	Sweden’s	‘solidarity’	mean	
merely	non-passivity,	or	will	it	come	in	the	form	of	military	as-
sistance?	And	 if	military	 assistance	 is	 offered,	will	 it	 be	 effec-
tive	 in	practice,	as	Sweden	still	does	not	participate	 in	NATO’s	
defence	planning?39.	For	the	Swedes	themselves,	continuation	of	
the	current	defence	policy	will	lead	to	questions	about	whether	
or	not	they	can	count	on	NATO	if	in	need. This	is	not	to	say	that	
the	debates	underway	in	Sweden	are	of	no	consequence	for	the	
country’s	partners	in	the	region.	the changes in sweden’s de-
fence discourse and policy may be conducive to strengthen-
ing security in the Baltic sea region, even though they are 
less likely to lead to closer bilateral defence co-operation be-
tween Poland and sweden. 
regional formats of political and military co-operation of-
fer possibilities for working together with sweden.	It	should	
be	noted	in	this	context	that	bilateral,	multilateral	and	regional	
military	co-operation,	either	within	or	outside	NATO,	is	becom-
ing	an	 increasingly	 important	 instrument	 in	 safeguarding	 the	
39	 Bo	Ljung,	Tomas	Malmöf,	Karlis	Neretnieks	and	Mike	Winnerstig	(publ.),	
The	Security	and	Defensibility	of	the	Baltic	States.	A	Comprehensive	Analy-
sis	of	a	Security	Complex	 in	 the	Making,	FOI	Report,	October	2012,	p.	 59,	
http://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_3471.pdf	
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security	 interests	 of	 individual	 NATO	 member	 states.	 Mean-
while	Northern	Europe,	including	the	Baltic	Sea	area,	is	the	only	
region	in	Poland’s	neighbourhood	whose	countries	share	similar	
assessments	of	 current	challenges	and	 threats.	Closer	political	
and	military	co-operation	in	the	region	could	serve	as	a	‘preven-
tative’	and	‘deterrent’	measure,	and	enable	faster	and	more	co-
-ordinated	reactions	in	the	event	of	crises. 
in the political dimension, Sweden’s	perception	of	the	geopo-
litical	changes	taking	place	in	the	Baltic	Sea	and	High	North	re-
gions	 could	 strengthen	 those	voices	 in	NATO	 (and	even	 in	 the	
EU)	which	point	to	the	growing	instability	and	likelihood	of	cri-
ses	 in	 the	peripheries	of	NATO	and	 the	EU.	For	NATO	and	 the	
EU,	Sweden	is	an	‘impartial’	player	in	regional	security	issues,	
unlike	Norway,	which	has	its	own	interests	in	the	High	North,	
and	 Finland,	 which	 traditionally	 has	 always	 been	 concerned	
about	its	neighbour	Russia.	The	fact	that	Sweden	is	not	a	NATO	
member	partly	excludes	Stockholm	from	debates	about	NATO’s	
defence	policy.	However,	 this	 limitation	might	be	overcome	by	
extending	 the	 security	 policy	 discussions	 to	 formats	 that	 do	
include	Sweden	(and	Finland),	such	as	the	meetings	of	defence	
ministers	of	the	so-called	Northern	Group,	which	brings	togeth-
er	the	Nordic	states,	the	Baltic	states,	Poland,	Germany	and	the	
United	Kingdom.	
in the military dimension, Sweden	will	be	interested	in	seek-
ing	new	forms	of	military	co-operation	with	NATO	in	the	region.	
The	Swedes	are	aware	of	the	need	to	ensure	their	Armed	Forc-
es’	 interoperability	with	NATO	beyond	 the	period	of	 intensive	
co-operation	 on	 foreign	 missions	 in	 Afghanistan,	 Kosovo	 and	
Libya.	They	have	also	been	promoting	the	concept	of	new-type	
partnerships	 between	 NATO	 and	 partner	 countries.	 Further-
more,	 they	 are	 aware	of	 the	growing	 importance	of	 the	NATO	
Response	 Force	 (NRF)	 in	maintaining	 interoperability	 and	 co-
operation	among	the	NATO	members	within	the	framework	of	
the	Connected	 Forces	 Initiative,	which	 is	 also	 open	 to	 partner	
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countries40.	For	this	reason,	the	Swedish	government	is	current-
ly	considering	participation	in	the	NRF,	an	idea	that	will	prob-
ably	 also	have	 the	backing	 of	 the	 largest	 opposition	party,	 the	
Social	Democrats,	which	would	ensure	Sweden’s	involvement	in	
the	NRF	in	the	future41.	It	is	not	inconceivable	that	in	the	longer	
term,	the	dialogue	on	security	of	the	Nordic-Baltic	region	could	
be	underpinned	by	military	co-operation	within	one	rotation	of	
the	NATO	Response	Force.	
We	 should	 also	 keep	 the	 so-called	 new security challenges in	
mind	(concerning	cyber-	and	energy	security).	The	Swedish	lead-
ership	realises	that	attacks	against	critical	infrastructures	(such	as	
energy	or	IT	infrastructures),	which	may	or	may	not	be	accompa-
nied	by	the	use	of	military	means,	are	becoming	a	staple	element	of	
future	crisis	and	conflict	scenarios,	including	in	Northern	Europe.	
Especially	 if	one	considers	the	current	and	planned	development	
of	infrastructures	for	the	extraction,	transportation	and	supply	of	
energy	resources	in	the	region.	For	political	and	financial	reasons,	
NATO	will	not	be	the	main	organisation	in	charge	of	dealing	with	
the	new	challenges	or	ensuring	cyber-	or	energy	security,	combat-
ing	terrorism	or	preventing	the	proliferation	of	weapons	of	mass	
destruction	in	the	member	states.	Nevertheless,	NATO	may	facili-
tate	 information	exchange,	 training,	exercises	and	co-ordination	
among	 its	members.	NATO	 also	 sees	 opportunities	 for	 co-opera-
tion	with	partner	countries	in	those	areas,	and	the	NATO	facilities	
in	the	region	(the	Cyber	Defence	Centre	of	Excellence	 in	Tallinn,	
Estonia,	and	the	Energy	Security	Centre	of	Excellence	in	Vilnius,	
40	 Anders	Fogh	Rasmussen,	address	at	security	conference	in	Sälen,	Sweden,	
NATO	and	Sweden:	Strong	Partners	in	support	of	the	United	Nations,	14	Jan-
uary	 2013,	 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_93824.htm.	 See	
also	Guillaume	Lasconjarias,	The	NRF:	from	a	Key	Driver	of	Transformation	
to	a	Laboratory	of	the	Connected	Forces	Initiative,	Research	Paper	No.	88,	
NATO	 Defense	 College,	 January	 2013,	 http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/
series.php?icode=1
41	 Ewa	Stenberg,	Regeringen	öppnar	för	att	gå	med	i	Natos	insatsstyrka,	Da-
gens Nyheter,	 15	 January	 2013,	 http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/regerin-
gen-oppnar-for-att-ga-med-i-natos-insatsstyrka
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Lithuania)	could	be	used	for	closer	co-operation	among	countries	in	
the	region,	including	NATO	members	as	well	as	the	non-members	
Sweden	and	Finland42.
As	regards	bilateral	military	co-operation	(outside	the	framework	
of	NATO),	 the	Nordic	 states	are	Sweden’s	main	partners	 for	de-
fence	co-operation	–	this	applies	both	to	exercises	and	training,	
and	to	armament	and	military	equipment	co-operation	–	because	
of	 the	 geographical	 proximity,	 linguistic	 and	 cultural	 similari-
ties,	as	well	as	some	similarities	with	regard	to	the	armament	and	
military	equipment	held.	For	these	reasons	Poland is not among 
sweden’s priority co-operation partners, and is regarded pri-
marily as a nato member in the region.	Sweden	and	Poland	
are	 involved	 in	 some	 co-operation	 projects	 concerning	military	
exercises	(such	as	the	submarine	rescue	exercises	held	by	the	two	
countries’	Navies),	and	could	try	to	extend	such	co-operation	to	
the	Air	Forces	(for	example,	by	including	a	Polish	component	in	
the	Swedish-Danish	exercise43).	From	Sweden’s	point	of	view,	bi-
lateral	co-operation	with	its	non-Nordic	partners	could	take	the	
form	of	an	economically	justified	collaboration	on	operation,	ser-
vicing	and	upgrades	of	armament	and	military	equipment	(where	
the	countries	concerned	possess	 the	same	systems),	and	related	
training	and	exercises.	However,	Sweden	would	have	to	see	bene-
fits	from	such	co-operation,	in	the	form	of	savings	for	the	Swedish	
Armed	Forces,	and/or	new	orders	for	the	Swedish	arms	industry,	
which	would	in	reality	require	Poland	to	purchase	Swedish-made	
armament	and	military	equipment.	This	is	of	course	does	not	rule	
out	possibilities	for	deeper	bilateral	co-operation	within	the	Euro-
pean	Union,	for	example	on	civilian	crisis	management	within	the	
framework	of	the	Common	Security	and	Defence	Policy,	especially	
with	regard	to	the	European	Union’s	eastern	neighbourhood.	
42	 Ioanna-Nikoletta	Zyga,	Emerging	Security	Challenges:	A	Glue	for	NATO	and	
Partners?,	Research	Paper	No.	85,	NATO	Defense	College,	November	2012,	
http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=1
43	 See	footnote	15.
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aPPendices 
appendix 1
size of the swedish armed Forces (operational component/
permanent units excluding the home guard) in 1997–201044
44	 Quoted	from	the	IISS,	The	Military	Balance	for	1997-2010.
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size of the swedish armed Forces with the home guard in 201145 
Swedish	Army
7000	troops	(permanent	units)
15,100	troops	(permanent	units	+	contract	units*)
*Soldiers of the contract units have civilian jobs, and are 
mobilised under temporary contracts when necessary.
Navy 3100	troops	(permanent	units	only)
Air	Force 3400	troops	(permanent	units	only)
Home	Guard
22,000	troops	**
**Only a small proportion of Home Guard soldiers 
work for the military on a permanent basis. The 
remainder are volunteers with civilian jobs
Several	 thousand	 troops	 serving	 in	 the	 command	 and	 logistics	
structures	should	be	added	to	the	above.
45	 Quoted	 from	Försvarsmakten	 och	 Fickformat	 2011.	 Stockholm	2011.	 p.	 19,	
http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/upload/dokumentfiler/publikationer/
fm_i_fickformat_2011_web.pdf	
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appendix 2
sweden’s military spending in 1989–2011  
(us$ billion, according to siPri)
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Sweden’s military spending in 1989–2011  
year military spending in  us$ billion, according to siPri
1989 7.239
1990 7.375
1991 6.947
1992 6.751
1993 6.731
1994 6.716
1995 6.731
1996 6.819
1997 6.478
1998 6.663
1999 6.916
2000 7.167
2001 6.699
2002 6.521
2003 6.473
2004 6.092
2005 6.172
2006 6.075
2007 6.235
2008 5.545
2009 5.438
2010 5.886
2011 5.960
